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THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
WHISTLEBLOWING
JESSELYN RADACK & KATHLEEN MCCLELLAN1
INTRODUCTION
The year 2009 began a disturbing new trend: the criminalization 
of whistleblowing. The Obama administration has pursued a quiet 
but relentless campaign against the news media and their sources. 
This Article focuses on the sources who,  more   often  than  not, are 
whistleblowers. A spate of “leak” prosecutions brought under the 
Espionage Act2 has shaken the world of whistleblower attorneys, good-
government groups, transparency organizations, and civil liberties 
advocates. The Obama administration has prosecuted fi ve criminal cases
1. Jesselyn Radack is National Security and Human Rights Director at the Government 
Accountability Project (GAP), a non-profi t organization dedicated to promoting corporate 
and government accountability by protecting whistleblowers, advancing occupational free 
speech, and empowering citizen activists. Kathleen McClellan is National Security and 
Human Rights Counsel at GAP. 
2.  Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (June 15, 1917).
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under the Espionage Act, which is more than all other presidential 
administrations combined.3
These “leak” prosecutions send a chilling message to public servants, 
as they are contrary to President Barack Obama’s pledge of openness and 
transparency.4 The vast majority of American citizens do not take issue with 
the proposition that some things should be kept secret, such as sources and 
methods, nuclear designs, troop movements, and undercover identities.5 
However, the campaign to fl ush out media sources smacks of retaliation and 
intimidation. The Obama administration is right to protect information that 
might legitimately undermine national security or put Americans at risk. 
However, it does not protect national security interests when it brings cases 
against whistleblowers who divulge information that communicates important 
information to the public; sparks meaningful dialogue; or exposes fraud, waste, 
abuse, illegality, or potential dangers to public health and safety. A free and 
open democratic government welcomes debate. Stifl ing information violates 
that democratic principle.
These “leak” prosecutions are a legal stretch and share many unusual 
elements. For example, they are brought under a novel theory of the Espionage 
Act espoused by a neo-conservative,6 and they often involve stale cases opened 
during the Bush administration.7 Further, the prosecutions identify no actual 
national security harm caused by the leak, and they target those who appear to 
be classic whistleblowers. 
3.    See Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, at 46, 47, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/23/110523fa_fact_mayer?
currentPage=all (noting that, of those fi ve, two were opened by the Bush 
administration); see also Michael Isikoff, ‘Double Standard’ in White House Leak 
Inquiries?, MSNBC (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39693850/ns/
us_news-security/t/double-standard-white-house-leak-inquiries/ (“Kim’s case was the 
fourth leak prosecution brought by the Obama administration in recent months. That’s 
more than the last three administrations combined.”); see also Scott Shane, Obama Steps 
up Prosecution of Leaks to the News Media, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010, at A1 (“President 
Obama has already outdone every previous president in pursuing leak prosecutions”).
4.    See Offi ce of the President-Elect, Ethics Agenda, http://change.gov/agenda/
ethics_ agenda/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (describing the President’s commitment to a 
transparent government by protecting whistleblowers).
5.    See Humphrey Taylor, Most People Think Releases by WikiLeaks Should be 
Illegal, ¶1 (2011), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/
447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1508/ArticleId/666/Default.aspx (analyzing a poll 
of 2,019 American adults which found that 69% felt that publishing Wikileaks documents 
could pose a security threat to the United States and should be illegal.).
6.    See generally GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL 
SECURITY, THE MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2010) (Ironically, Obama has presided 
over the most draconian crackdown on leaks in our history—even more so than Nixon.).
7.    See Shane Harris, Plugging the Leaks, WASHINGTONIAN, (July 21, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonian.com/print/articles/20/99/16361.html (recounting the Bush 
administration’s investigation into who leaked classifi ed CIA information to James 
Risen for his book, State of War); see also Editorial, The Obama Administration’s 
Attacks on the Media, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 16, 2010), (hereinafter Obama Attacks) 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/2010/aug/16/opinion/la-ed-leaks-
20100816 (questioning the purpose of keeping the case against Risen open now that State 
of War is four years old and focuses on a past presidential administration).
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Protecting whistleblowers rather than targeting them for criminal investigation 
would more surely protect national security than the Obama administration’s 
policy of using the Espionage Act to criminalize whistleblowing. This Article 
will explain how strengthening legal protections for whistleblowers will 
serve to stop leaks of properly secret information, actually enhancing national 
security. 
THE NEW YORK TIMES’ WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING STORY & 
THE SURGE OF LEAK INVESTIGATIONS
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times published an explosive story 
disclosing the National Security Agency’s (NSA) domestic spying program,8 
which plunged the United States deep into a constitutional crisis with few 
parallels in American history. It is not hyperbole to say that Americans were 
stunned by the revelation of the warrantless wiretapping program.9 The 
Senior Leaders of the intelligence community (IC) had a different reaction: 
on December 19, 2005, John Negroponte, former Director of National 
Intelligence, sent an e-mail to the NSA workforce, calling the Times article 
“an egregious disclosure of classifi ed information.”10 President Bush claimed, 
“My personal opinion is: it was a shameful act for someone to disclose this 
very important program in a time of war. The fact that we’re discussing this 
program is helping the enemy.”11  
The leak to the Times prompted justice department interest in prosecuting 
both the Times and the leakers.12 Privacy and civil liberties advocates 
quickly argued that the “leak investigation” should be set aside in favor of 
an investigation of the secret surveillance itself.13 However, on December 30, 
2005, the Justice Department (DOJ) launched a large-scale investigation into the 
sources for the Times December 16, 2005 article.14 The sprawling investigation 
included fi ve prosecutors and twenty-fi ve FBI agents, cost millions of dollars,
8.   See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/
politics/16program.html?pagewanted=911 (revealing the Bush administration’s dealings 
in domestic spying).
9.    See id. (describing the change of NSA policy from only performing foreign 
searches to also performing domestic searches).
10.   E-mail from John Negroponte, former Dir. Nat’l Intelligence, Nat’l Sec. Agency, 
to Nat’l Sec. Agency’s Workforce, Dec. 19, 2005 (on fi le with author).
11.   Transcript, President Bush’s News Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/19/politics/19text-bush.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx 
=1321334368-jebkUNiyDpBs5GYcDg6Asg
12.   Josh Gerstein, Wiretapping Leak Probe Dropped, POLITCO, (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53718.html.
13.   See id. (commenting that several public claims that the warrantless wiretapping 
program was illegal helped to stave off prosecution).
14.   See id. (recounting how the National Security Agency fi led a formal leak 
complaint shortly after the December 16, 2005 New York Times story on the secret 
surveillance program was published).
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and is still ongoing.15 The government identifi ed and targeted approximately 
1,000 people in the universe of possible sources, issued subpoenas for over 
fi fty individuals, and raided almost a dozen of their homes.16 About half of 
the dozen individuals were whistleblowers who had previously complained 
through proper internal channels about the NSA.17 For example, on July 26, 
2007, the FBI conducted coordinated armed raids on the homes of William 
Binney (a retired NSA mathematician), J. Kirk Wiebe (a retired NSA 
communications analyst), Edward Loomis (a retired NSA technician), and 
Diane Roark (a retired staffer on the House Intelligence Committee who 
held the NSA portfolio).18 The four had jointly fi led a Department of Defense 
Inspector General (DOD IG) complaint in 2002 regarding the NSA.19 Thomas 
Drake, discussed herein,20 served as the unnamed “DOD senior executive” 
source for the two-year investigation that ensued, which resulted in a Report 
that was damning to the ultra-secret agency, but immediately classifi ed and 
hidden from the public.21 Drake’s home was searched on November 28, 2007.22 
Drake initially drew the attention of the investigators because the government 
believed that he was a source for the Times article.23 Although Mr. Drake was 
not one of the Times’ sources and was never charged with leaking to the Times 
or any other media outlet, he is the only person that was prosecuted as a result 
of the leak investigation.24 This fact is all the more diffi cult to square with 
the Justice Department decision to drop their fi erce investigation in the fall 
of 2010 of former Department of Justice lawyer Thomas Tamm, who had 
publicly admitted to leaking information about President Bush’s electronic 
15.   See Mayer, supra note 3, at 60 (highlighting the massive efforts to fi nd and 
prosecute the media leaks). 
16.   See id., at 61–62 (describing the raids that preceded that on Drake).
17.   See Ellen Nakashima, Ex-NSA Offi cial Thomas Drake to Plead Guilty to 
Misdemeanor, WASH. POST, June 9, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
national-security/ex-nsa-manager-has-reportedly-twice-rejected-plea-bargains-in-
espionage-act-case/2011/06/09/AG89ZHNH_story.html (discussing Drake’s original 
attempt to report his concerns to multiple government offi cials). 
18.  See Mayer, supra note 3, at 61 (noting that the raided individuals believed the 
raids to be retribution).
19.   Defense Hotline case #85671, Sept. 4, 2002.
20.   See discussion infra at 63-67(describing the aftermath of Drake’s leaking to The 
Baltimore Sun).
21.   OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THE TRAILBLAZER AND THINTHREAD SYSTEMS, 05-INTEL-03, Dec. 15, 2004, (hereinafter 
TRAILBLAZER AND THINTHREAD SYSTEMS), available at http://www.whistleblower.org/
storage/documents/IGR.pdf (an unclassifi ed, heavily redacted portion of the Report was 
released in June 2011); see also Press Release, Inspector General Report Vindicates GAP 
Clients From National Security Agency, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, (June 
23, 2011), http://www.whistleblower.org/press/press-release-archive/1206-inspector-
general-report-vindicates-gap-clients-from-national-security-agency. 
22.  See Mayer, supra note 3, at 42 (discussing Drake’s experience with the agents 
and the raid that ensued).  
23.   See Mayer, supra note 3, at 43
24.   Id.
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eavesdropping program to the Times.25 Even more puzzling, Attorney General 
Eric Holder, Jr., testifi ed that he did not make the decision to drop the case 
against Tamm,26 which is curious given the knowledge and involvement 
of the uppermost echelons of the government in the Drake case, including 
President Barack Obama, Attorney General Holder, and Lanny Breuer, head
of the DOJ’s criminal division.27 The DOJ never indicted Russell Tice, another 
former NSA analyst who claimed to be a Times source.28  
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S AGGRESSIVE CRACKDOWN 
ON WHISTLEBLOWERS
The Bush administration never prosecuted suspected leakers in federal 
court, despite vigorously investigating leaks.29 Between 2005 and 2009, U.S. 
intelligence agencies made 183 referrals to the FBI, reporting unauthorized 
disclosures of classifi ed information.30 Subsequently, the FBI opened twenty-
six “leak investigations,” which identifi ed fourteen suspects, and prosecuted 
none of them.31
In contrast, the Obama administration has pursued “a quiet but malicious 
campaign against the news media and their sources, more aggressively 
attacking those who ferret out confi dential information than [ ] the George 
W. Bush administration did.”32 To make things worse, the administration is 
charging “leakers” under the Espionage Act, a little-used World War I-era
25.  See Josh Gerstein, Holder: Warrantless Wiretapping Leak Prosecution Rejected, 
But Not by Me, POLITICO (May 4, 2011, 11:10 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/ 
joshgerstein/0511/Holder_warrantless_wiretapping_leak_prosecution_rejected_but_not_
by_me.html (recounting that during a Senate Judiciary Committeee oversight hearing, 
Attorney General Eric Holder confi rmed the Justice Department’s decision not to prosecute 
Tamm, but denied personal involvement in the decision); see also Michael Isikoff, The Fed 
Who Blew the Whistle: Is He a Hero or a Criminal?, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 22, 2008), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/12/12/the-fed-who-blew-the-whistle.html 
(explaining that Tamm decided to publicly disclose information on this secret program 
because his knowledge of it had caused ethical uncertainty in his life).
26.   See Gerstein, supra note 25 (suggesting that, if Holder’s testimony is true, then 
senior prosecutors may never have formally requested subpoenas from the New York 
Times).
27.   See Gerstein, supra note 25.
28.   See Gerstein, supra note 25 (explaining that prosecutors have not contacted Tice 
for several years).
29.   See Mark Hosenball, House Republican Staffer Introduced Alleged NSA 
Leaker to Reporter, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
newsweek/blogs/declassifi ed/2010/04/16/exclusive-house-republican-staffer-introduced-
alleged-nsa-leaker-to-reporter.html. 
30.   See Steven Aftergood, FBI Found 14 Intel Leak Suspects in Past 5 Years, 
SECRECY NEWS, June 21, 2010, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2010/06/ intel_leak.html 
(noting an FBI document acknowledging that most of these referrals provide insuffi cient 
information for beginning an investigation); see also Harris, supra note 7 (explaining 
how President Bush criticized the New York Times article reporting that he authorized the 
secret surveillance program in the wake of September 11, 2011, by suggesting that such 
disclosure by the Times would endanger the safety of U.S. citizens).
31.   See Harris, supra note 7, at 35. 
32.   Obama Attacks, supra note 7.
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law that punishes the gathering, disclosure, or retention of national defense 
information that could harm the United States.33 The crackdown shows no 
signs of slowing down. It should be noted that most of the cases described 
below are in motion, and that their procedural posture may have changed by 
the time this Article goes to press.
1. Shamai Leibowitz
In December 2009, the government charged Shamai Leibowitz, a former 
contract linguist for the FBI, with disclosure of classifi ed information to the 
host of a blog.34 Specifi cally, Leibowitz disclosed fi ve papers to an unnamed 
blogger, now known to be Richard Silverstein35 He was charged with 
disclosure of classifi ed information under 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2006) (the SIGINT 
statute).36 Leibowitz pleaded guilty and was sentenced to twenty months in 
prison.37 Appallingly, even the judge did not know what information Leibowitz 
disclosed, or how it compromised the country.38 Even though Leibowitz never 
claimed to be a whistleblower, his stated motive for his disclosure meets the 
legal defi nition of whistleblowing.39 This claim is readily apparent from his 
statements made at his sentencing, where he stated:
During the course of my work I came across wrongdoings that 
led me to conclude this is an abuse of power and a violation of 
the law. . . . I disclosed the violations to a member of the media 
. . . . I would like to emphasize . . . that I was not motivated by 
greed, fame, personal ambition, or foreign interests. I made a 
33.   See Mayer, supra note 3, at 46, 47 (noting that the Obama administration has been 
using the 1917 law in more leak prosecutions than all previous administrations combined).
34.   See Maria Glod, Former FBI Employee Sentenced for Leaking Classifi ed Papers, 
WASH. POST, May 25, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/ 05/24/AR2010052403795.html (noting that Leibowitz leaked 
information while he worked on contract with the FBI). 
35.   See United States v. Leibowitz, Criminal No. AW-09-CR-0632 (D. Md. 2010) 
(stating that the fi ve documents were “secret” and that they contained information 
regarding communication intelligence activities); Scott Shane, Leak Offers Look At Efforts 
By U.S. To Spy On Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, at A1 (revealing blogger to be Richard 
Silverstein).
36.   See id. (describing the defendant’s disclosure of classifi ed information was 
done “knowingly and willfully”); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 798 (a) (2006) (requiring that 
anyone who “knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise 
makes available to an unauthorized person . . . any classifi ed information [regarding 
communication intelligence] . . . be fi ned . . . or imprisoned [up to] ten years, or both”).
37.   See Aftergood, supra note 30 (remarking that Leibowitz’s sentence is longer than 
that of any previous convicted leaker).
38.   See Glod, supra note 34 (opining that the federal government’s response to the 
leak convinced the judge of the offense’s seriousness, despite not knowing the contents of 
the leak).
39.   Cf., 5 U.S.C. § 213 (2006) (explaining that the section covers employees, 
former employees, and applicants for employment who disclose information that they 
“reasonably believe [ ] evidences—(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or (B) 
gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
specifi c danger to public health or safety”).
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mistake but only because I believed it was in the best interests
of the American people. I truly regret that my misguided 
patriotism led me to make a mistake . . . .40 
The legal defi nition of whistleblowing includes disclosures to the media, 
regarding an abuse of authority.41 The blogger Leibowitz disclosed to, 
Silverstein, confi rmed Leibowitz’s salutary motives: “I see him as an American 
patriot and a whistle-blower, and I’d like his actions to be seen in that context”42
Leibowitz also said that he should have pursued other options within the 
government to report his concerns, such as reporting to the DOD IG, though 
it is questionable whether that would have afforded him greater protection.43 
2. Thomas Drake
Even if Leibowitz had reported his concerns through “proper” internal 
channels within the government, subsequent events indicate that he would 
have fared no better. For example, Thomas Drake, a former senior executive at 
the NSA, had concerns about massive waste, mismanagement, illegality, and 
a willingness to compromise the privacy of U.S. citizens.44 He reported his 
concerns to as many people within the IC as possible, including his immediate 
supervisors, the NSA’s inspector general, the DOD IG, and Congressional 
intelligence committees.45 When all these routes produced no results, he went 
to a Baltimore Sun reporter with information that was not even classifi ed.46
Drake initially landed on the government’s radar screen as a result of the 
New York Times leak investigation.47 The government believed Drake was 
a source for the warrantless wiretapping story, a belief Drake consistently 
refuted, and the Government never presented any evidence that Drake was 
40.   Steven Aftergood, Jail Sentence Imposed in Leak Case, SECRECY NEWS (May 25, 
2010), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2010/ 05/jail_leak.html.
41. Cf., 5 U.S.C. § 1213 (2006) (explaining that the section covers employees, 
former employees, and applicants for employment who disclose information that they 
“reasonably believe [ ] evidences—(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or (B) 
gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
specifi c danger to public health or safety”); See also Horton v. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 
282 (Fed. Cir. 1995 (noting that disclosures to the press are protected disclosures)
42. Scott Shane, Leak Offers Look At Efforts By U.S. To Spy On Israel, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 2011, at A1.
43.   See id. (explaining Leibowitz’s lack of continued attempts to properly report the 
information after the original attempt was unsuccessful). 
44.   See Shane, supra note 3 (noting that Drake worried that the government’s 
eavesdropping programs wasted millions of dollars when a program like ThinThread could 
fi lter the NSA’s collected data while better protecting privacy).
45.   See id. (explaining that agency leaders ignored Drake’s complaints, and instead 
used a program called Trailblazer, which they later judged to be expensive and ineffi cient).
46.   See Mayer, supra note 3, at 59–64 (stating that, while Drake claims he made 
sure to disclose only unclassifi ed information, the government insists that some of the 
documents were either classifi ed, or that they were meant to be classifi ed and Drake should 
have known that).
47.   See Mayer, supra note 3, at 63–64 (noting that Drake denied his involvement in 
the Times leak and admitted contacting the Baltimore Sun).
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a source for Times.48 Drake was a senior executive at the NSA, who served 
as the primary material witness in the DOD IG complaint fi led by retired 
colleagues about the NSA choosing an expensive, invasive, undeveloped, 
and ultimately failed domestic surveillance program called Trailblazer over a 
cheaper, effective, legal alternative called ThinThread.49 ThinThread had built-
in features to protect the privacy of individual Americans.50 The DOD IG 
investigated the complaint over several years, and, in a December 2004 Audit 
Report, substantiated the whistleblowers’ claims.51  
In the time period between the Leibowitz case and the Drake case, the 
government shifted strategies. Originally, the government had contemplated 
charging Drake under the SIGINT statute —as it did with Leibowitz— with 
giving information to a reporter but it never fi led the draft indictment.52 Instead, 
a new prosecutor, William M. Welch, II, took over the case and charged 
Drake under § 793(e) of the Espionage Act with “retaining” national defense 
information at home, obstruction of justice, and making false statements.53 
Drake faced up to thirty-fi ve years in jail.   
Drake thus entered the history books as the fourth case in which the 
Espionage Act was used to charge someone for allegedly mishandling classifi ed 
information; specifi cally, Drake allegedly retained classifi ed information 
at the time he was in touch with a Baltimore Sun reporter who chronicled 
mismanagement at the Agency in an award-winning series of articles.54
48.   See Mayer, supra note 3, at 60 (explaining that while investigators believed that 
the source who leaked to the Baltimore Sun was the same person who leaked to the New 
York Times, they never proved this). 
49.   See 60 Minutes: U.S. v. Whistleblower Tom Drake (CBS television broadcast 
May 22, 2011), available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7366912n 
(“One of them was Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, the head of the agency: Hayden 
wanted to transform the agency and launched a massive modernization program, code 
named: “Trailblazer.” It was supposed to do what Thin Thread did, and a whole lot more. 
Trailblazer would be the NSA’s biggest project. Hayden’s philosophy was to let private 
industry do the job. Enormous deals were signed with defense contractors. [Bill] Binney’s 
Thin Thread program cost $3 million; Trailblazer would run more than $1 billion and take 
years to develop.”)
50.   See Mayer, supra note 3, at 52–53 (describing how ThinThread would discard 
unnecessary fi les, immediately to prevent overloading).
51.   See Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence, REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
TRAILBLAZER AND THINTHREAD SYSTEMS, Nov. 23, 2004, available at http://www.
whistleblower.org/storage/documents/IGR.pdf (responding to allegations such as 
Trailblazer’s wasting of federal money, and the NSA’s disregard of effective options).
52.   See Shane Harris, Indictment Continues Obama Administration’s War on 
Leaks, WASHINGTONIAN, Jan. 25, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonian.com/
blogarticles/people/capitalcomment/18114.html (explaining that after the case was 
transferred from the senior Justice Department attorney to a new attorney in 2010, the 
majority of the charges were dropped).
53.   See United States v. Drake, No. 1:10-CR-00181-RDB, 2010 WL 1513342 (D. 
Md fi led Apr. 14, 2010) (indictment) (listing fi ve counts of willful retention of nation 
defense information, one count of obstruction of justice, and three counts of making a false 
statement).
54.   Id.
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Tellingly, the fi rst case proceeded against Pentagon Papers whistleblower 
Daniel Ellsberg. It was subsequently dismissed because of government 
misconduct.55 Drake’s case became “one of the Obama administration’s most 
prominent efforts to punish accused leakers.”56
After winning the Ridenhour Prize for Truth-Telling and being featured in 
a hard-hitting investigative piece by Jane Mayer in The New Yorker,57 as well 
as featured on the fi nal episode of the season on “60 Minutes,” the case was 
propelled into the national spotlight.58 After a string of adverse rulings for the 
government, the Justice Department approached Drake with a series of plea 
bargains, a number of which he rejected.59 The Drake case ended dramatically 
in “a last-minute plea deal . . . abruptly ending a high-profi le case in the Obama 
[A]dministration’s pursuit of government leaks to the press.”60 The government 
dropped all ten felony charges, and Drake pleaded guilty to a single minor 
misdemeanor charge of “exceeding his authorized use of a computer,” with a 
recommendation from the government of no jail time and no fi ne.61 The failed 
case is clearly seen as a loss for the government. Steven Aftergood, head of the 
Federation of American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy, followed 
the Drake case closely, and later described the plea bargain as: “a pale shadow 
of the original indictment . . . . The defendant was facing decades in prison, 
and all of the sudden the government says never mind [sic]. It’s a pretty big 
reversal of course.”62  
55.   See U.S. v. Russo & Ellsberg, Crim. No. 9373 (WNB) (C.D.Cal. 1973) (dismissing 
the case after the federal government admitted to spying on the defense team via wiretaps); 
see also United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985), aff’d, 844 F.2d 1057 
(4th Cir. 1988) (deciding the second case prosecuted under the Espionage Act for allegedly 
mishandling classifi ed information brought against Samuel Loring Morison);U.S. v. 
Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d 557 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (deciding 
the third case prosecuted under the Espionage Act for allegedly mishandling classifi ed 
information brought by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) case 
against lobbyists Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman. The prosecution of Ellsberg and 
Russo after the Pentagon Papers disclosure never reached a verdict because a mistrial was 
declared on the grounds of fl agrant government misconduct. Morison was convicted and 
later pardoned by President Clinton, and the AIPAC case was aborted).
56.   Ellen Nakashima, Files in Leak Case are Pulled, WASH. POST, June 9, 2011.
57.   See Jane Mayer, supra note 3 (explaining the Drake case and the current state of 
affairs with handling of whistleblowers under the Obama Administration).
58.   See 60 Minutes: U.S. v. Whistleblower Tom Drake, (CBS broadcast May 22 
2011), available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7366912n.
59.   See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Ex-NSA Manager Has Reportedly Twice Rejected Plea 
Bagains in Espionage Act Case, WASH. POST (June 9, 2011, 11:00 AM), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/ex-nsa-manager-has-reportedly-
twice-rejected-plea-bargains-in-espionage-act-case.html (detailing how Drake turned 
down a deal to plead guilty to unauthorized retention of classifi ed documents, similar to the 
deal accepted in a 2005 plea by former national security adviser Samuel R. “Sandy” Berger, 
after he removed and shredded classifi ed material relating to the Clinton administration’s 
record on terrorism from the National Archives).
60.   Brent Kendall, Plea Deal Ends Leak Case Against Former Offi cial, WALL ST. J., 
June 10, 2011, at A7.
61.   Id. (“In a sign of how far the government retreated, the Justice Department said 
in the plea agreement that it wouldn’t object if Mr. Drake faced no jail time.”).
62.   See id.
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NSA kept the December 2004 DOD IG Report vindicating Drake completely 
secret until June 2011.63 After it was clear the Drake case would not go to 
trial, the NSA released a heavily redacted copy in response to Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests from watchdog groups, including the 
Government Accountability Project, and media outlets.64
Drake was sentenced on July 15, 2011.65 Revealing the reasoning behind the 
prosecution, Welch requested an upward departure from the federal sentencing 
guidelines in the form of a $50,000 fi ne in order to “send a message” to the 
“thousands of employees, whether they’re in NSA, CIA, DIA” who sign 
non-disclosure agreements.66 Federal Judge Richard D. Bennett sharply 
criticized DOJ’s handling of the case, demanding an explanation for what he 
called the “unconscionable” delay between the 2007 raid on Drake’s home 
and the indictment.67 Prosecutor Welch had no explanation. Judge Bennett 
further lambasted the government, comparing the treatment of Drake to 
British government abuses against colonial Americans and concluding that the 
case against Drake “did not pass the smell test.”68 Judge Bennett denied the 
prosecution’s request, and, noting that Drake had been through “four years of 
hell,” sentenced him to probation and community service.69 After sentencing, 
Drake refl ected on the experience of being a whistleblower and the target of a
63.   See R. Jeffery Smith, Classifi ed Pentagon Report Upholds Thomas Drake’s 
Complaints About NSA, WASH. POST, June 22, 2011, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/classified-pentagon-report-upholds-
thomas-drakes-complaints-about-nsa/2011/06/22/AG1VHTgH_story.html; see also Press 
Release, Inspector General Report Vindicates GAP Clients From National Security Agency, 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, (June 23, 2011), http://www.whistleblower.org/
press/press-release-archive/1206-inspector-general-report-vindicates-gap-clients-from-
national-security-agency (discussing the heavily redacted release from the United States 
Department of Defense).
64.   Id.
65. Sentencing Hearing Transcript, U.S. v. Drake, Crim. No. 10-181 (RDB) (D.MD 
2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/drake/071511-transcript.pdf. 
66. Id., at 16-17.
67. Id., at 42-43.
68. Id., at 30 (“did not pass the smell test”), 42-43 (comparing the delay between the 
raid and indictment to British crown abuses in colonial America).
69. Id. at 29 (“four years of hell”), 46 (sentence of probation and community service).
2011]          THE CRIMINALIZATION OF WHISTLEBLOWING         67 
 “multi-year, multi-million dollar ‘leak’ investigation,” explaining that his life 
and the life of his colleagues would “never be the same again.”70  
Drake’s case was to be the fi rst trial in the Obama Administration’s 
aggressive efforts to plug leaks—but it imploded in spectacular fashion as an 
instance of overreach,71 miscalculation,72 and “payback for whistleblowing.”73
Former head of the Information Security Oversight Offi ce (ISOO) under the 
George W. Bush administration and expert for Mr. Drake’s criminal defense 
team, J. William Leonard, wrote in the L.A. Times that the information Mr. 
Drake was accused of illegally retaining “never should have been classifi ed” in 
the fi rst place and fi led a formal complaint with the offi ce he used to lead.74 The 
case against Drake was also hailed as a “setback,”75 and “major defeat,”76 and 
“the almost complete collapse of the government’s effort to make an example 
of Mr. Drake.”77 However, the long-term success in quelling the government’s 
efforts to use an espionage law to target suspected leakers remains to be seen.
70. Dylan Blaylock, Tom Drake Post-Sentencing Statement, The Whistleblogger, Jul. 
20, 2011, http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-2010/1318-tom-drake-post-sentencing-
statement (last accessed Nov. 21, 2011) (“My life and those of four other colleagues were 
turned inside out and personally and professionally shattered as a result of becoming 
the targets of a multi-year, multi-million dollar “leak” investigation led by the Justice 
Department. Our lives will never be the same again . . .”). Drake also published two op-eds 
refl ecting on his experience and emphasizing the signifi cance of his concerns and need for 
whistleblower protections for Intelligence Community whistleblowers. See Thomas Drake, 
Why are we Subverting the Constitution in the Name of security?, WASH. POST., Aug. 25, 
2011, available at http://www.washington post.com/opinions/why-are-we-subverting-the-
constitution-in-the-name-of-security/2011/08/25/gIQANnrheJ_story.html; Thomas Drake 
& Jesselyn Radack, A Surprising War on Leaks Under Obama, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 
Aug. 1, 2011, available at http://articles.philly.com/2011-08-01/news/29838846_1_
whistle-blowers-jesselyn-radack-obama.
71.  See Shaun Waterman, Government’s Espionage Case Against NSA Offi cial 
Stumbles, WASH. TIMES, June 10, 2011, at A5; Editorial, Overreaching on Leaks, WASH. 
POST, June 13, 2011, at A16; Tricia Bishop, Former NSA Employee Pleads Guilty to Lesser 
Charge in Leak Case, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2011; Editorial, A Case that Could be Overkill 
Against a Whistleblower, WASH. POST, June 6, 2011, at A16; Ellen Nakashima, Some 
Charges May be Dropped Move is ‘Clearly a Setback,’ Expert Says, WASH. POST, June 9, 
2011, at A1.
72.   Tricia Bishop, Drake Pleads Guilty to Misdemeanor in NSA Espionage Case, 
BALTIMORE SUN, June 10, 2011 (quoting Steven Aftergood).
73.   See, e.g. id..
74. J. William Leonard, Op-Ed., When Secrecy Gets Out of Hand, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 2011, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-
leonard-classifi ed-information-20110810,0,5688807.story. Leonard’s formal complaint 
with his former offi ce requests an investigation and discipline for the the NSA and Justice 
Department offi cials who over-classifi ed the information in Drake’s criminal case. See 
Scott Shane, Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classifi cation of Documents, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/us/02 secret.html. 
75.   Scott Shane, Ex-N.S.A. Aide Gains Plea Deal in Leak Case; Setback to U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2011, at A1; Ellen Nakashima, Ex-NSA Offi cial Thomas Drake to Plead 
Guilty to Misdemeanor, WASH. POST, June 9, 2011; Ellen Nakashima, Some Charges May 
Be Dropped Move is ‘Clearly a Setback,’ Expert Says, WASH. POST, June 9, 2011 at A1.
76.  Jane Mayer, Is the N.S.A. Whistleblower Case Falling Apart?, NEW YORKER, 
June 9, 2011, available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/06/
is-the-nsa-whistleblower-case-falling-apart.html.
77.   Shane, supra note 75.
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3. Bradley Manning
On June 7, 2010, the U.S. military arrested Private First Class (PFC) Bradley 
Manning for alleged unauthorized disclosure of classifi ed information.78 
Among other things, Manning is suspected of having provided WikiLeaks, a 
radical anti-secrecy website, with a video of a 2007 Apache helicopter gunning 
down unarmed Iraqi civilians, daily fi eld reports from the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and 250,000 pages of diplomatic cables.79 Because Manning’s 
case is governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), technically, 
he “has not been indicted under the Espionage Act, but its evil twin; he faces 
the charge of ‘aiding the enemy,’” a crime punishable by death.80 Manning 
is scheduled to have a fi rst hearing before a military court on December 16, 
2011. Additionally, a grand jury heard testimony in June 2011 in a continuing 
investigation of WikiLeaks.81 The government is also considering prosecuting 
its founder, Julian Assange, under the Espionage Act.82
Unlike the cases involving Leibowitz and Drake, the media immediately 
dubbed Manning a whistleblower.83 He fi ts the profi le. According to one friend, 
Manning had “misgivings about Iraq because of what he was learning as an 
intelligence analyst . . . about ‘how messed up the situation is.’”84 According 
to another close friend, “[h]e wanted to do the right thing . . . [h]e wanted 
people held accountable and wanted to see this didn’t happen again.”85 Even 
the person who turned in Manning, former computer hacker Adrian Lamo, said 
“he was ‘deeply confl icted’ about reporting Manning, ‘given that Bradley is an 
78.  See Elisabeth Bumiller, Army Leak Suspect Is Turned In, by Ex-
Hacker, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/
08/world/08leaks.html.
79.   Id.
80.   See Judy Bachrach, Espionage, Manning, and Assange, WORLD AFFAIRS J., (May 
29, 2011), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/bachrach/Espionage (Article 
134 is the UCMJ counterpart to the Espionage Act).
81.   See Scott Shane, U.S. Pressing Its Crackdown Against Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, June 
17, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/us/politics/18leak.
html?pagewanted=all (highlighting the increased pressure that the government has placed 
on apprehending the sources of leaks).
82.   Compare Ruth King, Gabriel Schoenfeld: Amazing . . . For Once the 
Government Kept a Secret, WALL STREET J., May 6, 2011, available at http://www.
ruthfullyyours.com/2011/05/06/gabriel-schoenfeld-amazing-for-once-the-government-
kept-a-secret/, with WikiLeaks, the Espionage Act & the First Amendment: The Law, 
Politics & Policy of Prosecuting Julian Assange, AM. U. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Jan. 
11, 2011, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/news/wikileaksevent.cfm (raising 
potential problems of prosecuting Assange based on jurisdiction, extradition, etc.).
83.   See, e.g., Anna Mulrine, WikiLeaks Suspect: Where Army See Traitor, Some See 
Whistleblower, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, March 3, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Justice/2011/0303/WikiLeaks-suspect-Where-Army-sees-traitor-some-see-
whistleblower.
84.   Ellen Nakashima, Bradley Manning is at the Center of the WikiLeaks Controversy. 
But Who is he? WASH. POST, May 8, 2011, at 8, 16 (quoting Keith Rose, a close friend of 
Manning’s).
85.   Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in 
WikiLeaks Video Probe, WIRED.COM (June 6, 2010), at 3-4, http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2010/06/leak/ (quoting Manning’s friend, Tyler Watkins).
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individual acting out of his conscience and his desire to make the world a better 
place.’”86 Manning’s alleged disclosures reveal potential fraud and illegality in 
an expensive and decade-long military engagement in Afghanistan.87  
Like the other defendants, the disclosures Manning allegedly made do not 
reveal anything about the United States’ military strategy. Instead, the problems 
they highlight are precisely those that are crucial to the public discussion of 
whether the war in Afghanistan is worth continuing.88
4. Stephen Kim
On August 19, 2010, the Justice Department indicted Stephen Kim, a former 
Senior Adviser for Intelligence on detail to the State Department Arms Control 
Compliance Bureau, charging him with disclosing national defense information 
in June 2009 during an interview with Fox News and lying about it to the 
FBI.89 Like Leibowitz, Kim did not claim to be a whistleblower; however, it 
is undisputable that the information he allegedly leaked was of high public 
interest, as U.S. intelligence had already warned that North Korea would 
likely attempt another nuclear test following United Nations sanctions.90 John 
Bolton, the former Undersecretary of State for Disarmament, and a noted hard-
liner on North Korea, said the disclosures in the Fox News story about North 
Korean intentions were “neither particularly sensitive nor all that surprising.” 
It involved the kind of information that could have been gleaned from reading 
stories in the South Korean press at the time, he noted.91
Like many of the other leak cases, the Kim case was remarkable for being 
unremarkable. Moreover, South Korea, China, and other neighbors have 
an indisputable public interest in knowing if North Korea plans to conduct 
another nuclear explosive test.
5. Jeffrey Sterling
Showing no signs of slowing down in the new year, on January 6, 2011, DOJ 
arrested former CIA agent Jeffrey Sterling on charges that he “leaked” national
86.  Nakashima, supra note 84, at 18 (quoting Adrian Lamo).
87. Cf., 5 U.S.C. § 213 (2006)(explaining that the section covers employees, former 
employees, and applicants for employment who disclose information that they “reasonably 
believe [ ] evidences—(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or (B) gross 
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specifi c 
danger to public health or safety”).
88.   See Obama Attacks, supra note 7.  
89.   See United States v. Kim, No. 1:10-cr-00225-CKK (D.D.C fi led Aug. 19, 2010). 
(indictment) (charging Kim with one count of unauthorized disclosure of national defense 
information and one count of making false statements).
90.   Spencer S. Hsu, State Dept. Contractor Charged in Leak to News Organization, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2010, at A14.
91.   Michael Isikoff, supra note 3.
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 defense information to the media.92 Although not in the indictment, it is widely 
known that Sterling is suspected of being the source for a chapter in James 
Risen’s book, State of War.93 The chapter describes a botched CIA program 
called “Merlin,” which involved an attempt to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program 
by providing fl awed blueprints for key components to the Iranians.94 However, 
the fl aws were so obvious that the Iranians detected them, and it turns out 
that the United States may have given too much real nuclear information to 
the Iranians and that the operation helped Iran to advance its development of 
nuclear weapons.95 Clearly, this is something that is in the public interest to 
know, especially in light of a recent United Nations report that Iran is further 
along in developing nuclear devices than previously thought.96
Although Sterling, like Leibowitz, does not claim the mantle of 
“whistleblower,” he certainly fi ts the bill: his alleged disclosures undoubtedly 
reveal “a substantial and specifi c danger to public . . . safety.”97
OBAMA’S WAR ON WHISTLEBLOWERS AND THE MEDIA
As a candidate, and when fi rst elected, Obama espoused protecting 
whistleblowers. His transition website stated:
Protect Whistleblowers: Often the best source of information about 
waste, fraud and abuse in government is an existing government 
employee committed to public integrity and willing to speak out. Such 
acts of courage and patriotism, which can sometimes save lives and 
often save taxpayer dollars, should be encouraged rather than stifl ed. . . 
. We need to empower federal employees as watchdogs of wrongdoing 
and partners in performance.98
92.   See U.S. v. Sterling, No. 1:10cr485 (E.D.V.A. Dec. 22, 2010) (Indictment) 
(charging Sterling with leaking information to the media). 
93.   See Motion of James Risen to Quash Subpoena and/or For Protective Order, at 
7; U.S. v. Sterling, No. 1:10cr485 (E.D.V.A. June 21, 2011) (insinuating that inquiring the 
source of the quotations would reveal Sterling as the Source of Risen’s information in his 
book).
94.   See JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION, at 193–219 (2006) (describing the details and failure of Operation 
Merlin). 
95.  Id. at 211.
96. ATOMS FOR PEACE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT 
SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNSEL 
RESOLUTIONS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Nov. 8, 2011, available at http://
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2011/IAEA-Nov-2011-Report-Iran.pdf? ref 
=world. 
97.   Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) 
(codifi ed as amended at 5 U.S.C. §s 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) (2006)).
98.  Offi ce of the President-Elect, Ethics Agenda, http://change.gov/agenda/
ethics_agenda/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).  
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Free speech, good-government, and whistleblower advocates are perplexed 
and disappointed that Obama’s campaign promises of openness and transparency 
are being transmogrifi ed into a full-fl edged war on whistleblowers, who try to 
shine light on government wrongdoing.
It is no secret that “Obama has privately seethed and vented over leaks.”99 
This was evidenced early on by the embarrassment over General Stanley 
McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, complaining in Rolling 
Stone magazine about his bosses and the Afghan war he was leading.100 Obama 
dismissed McChrystal, but the Pentagon later conducted an inquiry that 
cleared the general of wrongdoing.101 In a more recent and glaring example 
of whistleblower retaliation, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley was 
forced to resign after he said that the Pentagon’s treatment of Manning was 
“ridiculous and counterproductive and stupid.”102
[N]o one on [Obama’s] staff was brave enough to tell [Obama] that 
obsessing over leaks was a colossal waste of time. . . . But it wouldn’t 
have mattered: leaks offended Obama’s sense of discipline and reminded 
him of everything he disliked about the [Capitol]. He was fearsome on 
the subject, which seemed to bring out his controlling nature to an even 
greater degree than usual.103
In addition to Obama’s personal disdain for “leaking,” other experts 
suggest that the Obama administration is likely compensating the IC for the 
anger it caused by releasing the memos regarding torture under the Bush 
administration.104 More generally, Obama may be trying to alter the perception 
that he is weak on national security and intelligence issues. In the Drake case in
99.   Michael Isikoff, supra note 3; see also Scott Shane, Obama Takes a Hard Line 
Against Leaks to Press, NY TIMES, June 10, 2010, at A3 (quoting Steven Aftergood, head 
of the project on government secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists, who said 
“Obama is driven to distraction by leaks”).
100. See Michael Hastings, The Runaway General, ROLLING STONE, Jun. 25, 2011, 
available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622 
(describing the concerns that the General had about the mismanagement of the Afghan 
War).
101. See Robert Burns, Pentagon Inquiry Clears McChrystal of Wrongdoing, MSNBC 
(Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42648539/ns/politics-more_politics/ 
(citing DOD IG report fi nding that McChrystal had not violated any applicable legal or 
ethics standard); see also Ellen Nakashima, Former NSA Executive Thomas A. Drake May 
Pay High Price for Media Leak, WASH POST, July 14, 2010, at C5 (“whistleblowers [are] 
targeted by an Obama administration bent on sealing leaks.”)
102. Mark Landler and Michael D. Shear, Offi cial Exits State Dept. After Jabs at 
Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/03/14/us/politics/14crowley.html.
103. JONATHAN ALTER, THE PROMISE: PRESIDENT OBAMA, YEAR ONE, 155 (2010).
104. Josh Gerstein, Justice Dept. Cracks Down on Leaks, POLITICO (May 25, 2010), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/37721.html. 
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particular, many speculated that the government is eager for a sign of progress 
in the investigation into the New York Times sources.105
Any of these reasons would only be compounded by the most predictable 
reason for punishing “leakers”: retaliation for embarrassing those in 
power. Early in his presidency, Obama stated: “[M]y Administration is 
committed to operating with an unprecedented level of openness . . . [A] 
democratic government accountable to the people must be as transparent 
as possible and must not withhold information for self-serving reasons 
or simply to avoid embarrassment.”106 But, when examined closely, the 
leaks being prosecuted embarrassed the government by exposing high-
level government corruption, ineptitude, and illegality. They did not 
harm to national security, which is a valid concern that the government 
has denigrated to a fear-mongering tactic. The Drake case exemplifi es 
this clearly, not only because his information regarding waste refl ected 
poorly on the government, but also because he disclosed unclassifi ed 
information to the Baltimore Sun only after his complaining internally 
produced no tangible results; the obviousness of the government’s 
embarrassment clearly indicates retaliation.107 
Likewise, Sterling’s alleged disclosure publicized the CIA’s failure to infi ltrate 
Iran’s nuclear program.108 Meanwhile, the Obama administration, despite 
promising rhetoric, has yet to successfully curb the rampant over-classifi cation 
plaguing the IC, as, in the fi rst year alone, Obama’s administration designated 
224,734 new secrets, 22.6% more than those created the previous year.109 In 
2010, the Obama administration classifi ed nearly 77 million documents, an 
increase of 40% above his fi rst year in offi ce.110
The only thing worse than embarrassing those in power is exposing crimes 
of the powerful. The retaliation is ramped up by an order of magnitude. For 
a President who declined to investigate war crimes, torture, and warrantless 
wiretapping by senior Bush offi cials, targeting mid-level bureaucrats is 
hypocritical, and it adds insult to injury to go after whistleblowers.
The Obama administration’s attack on whistleblowers is also an indirect 
attack on the media, and is certainly trying to lay the groundwork with 
105. Ellen Nakashima, Act of Honor, or Betrayal?, WASH. POST, July 14, 2010, at C1, 
C5.
106. Press Release, Classifi ed Info, and Controlled Unclassifi ed Info., May 27, 2009, 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/wh052709.html.
107. See Obama Attacks, supra note 7 (arguing that the Obama administration’s 
prosecution of whistleblowers is malicious).
108. Glenn Greenwald, War on Whistleblowers Intensifi es, SALON (May 25, 2010), 
http://news.salon.com/2007/11/01/whistleblowers/.
109. Editorial, Return of the Plumbers: The Obama Administration is Waging War 
Against Leakers, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/18836544.
110. Editorial, Why is that a Secret?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, at A26, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/opinion/why-is-that-a-secret.html. 
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precedents that can be used to attack the press.111 Schoenfeld himself suggested 
that journalists who publish allegedly classifi ed information should be 
criminally prosecuted.112 As with the attack on whistleblowers, cases brought 
against journalists who ferreted out confi dential information appear to have 
little to do with protecting national security interests.  
The DOJ’s repeated attempts to subpoena journalist James Risen in the 
Sterling case illustrate how easily the attack on whistleblowers becomes an 
attack on the media.113 The DOJ has issued a third subpoena for Risen undeterred 
by facts that (1) a federal judge already quashed a grand jury subpoena for 
Risen’s testimony and (2) Risen’s testimony is not necessary to identify his 
source—the Justice Department already believes Sterling is his source.114 The 
subpoena seeks to force James Risen, a New York Times correspondent, to 
testify about his sources for his book State of War.115   
In a motion to quash the subpoena, Risen’s attorneys argued that the 
subpoena is further retaliation against Risen’s exposure of controversies 
during the Bush administration.116 Risen fi led an affi davit describing how 
“[t]he Bush Administration was embarrassed by the disclosures [he] made 
in the course of [his] reporting . . . and eventually singled [him] out as a 
target for political harassment.”117 Specifi cally, Risen believes the retaliation 
and harassment began “as part of an effort by the Bush Administration to 
punish [him] and silence [him], following the publication of the [2005] NSA 
wiretapping story.”118 Risen was even “told by a reliable source that Vice 
President Dick Cheney pressured the Justice Department to personally target 
[him] because [Cheney] was unhappy with [Risen’s] reporting and wanted to 
see [him] in jail.”119 Risen also described how the DOJ repeatedly threatened 
him with prosecution under the Espionage Act, and explained his belief 
that, by threatening prosecution, “the Government was trying to intimidate 
journalists, like me, who publish stories that expose excessive government 
111. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 3, at 57 (“Because reporters often retain unauthorized 
defense documents, Drake’s conviction would establish a legal precedent making it possible 
to prosecute journalists as spies.”).
112. See GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE 
MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW 265 (2010).
113. See Charlie Savage, Subpoena Issued to Writer in CIA-Iran Leak Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 24, 2011, at A18 (showing that whistleblower investigations often result in the 
journalist being compelled to reveal their sources).
114. See id.
115. Jane Mayer, James Risen’s Subpoena, NEW YORKER, May 24, 2011, http://www.
newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/james-risens-subpoena.html. 
116. Motion of James Risen to Quash Subpoena and/or For Protective Order, at 12, 
U.S. v. Sterling, No. 1:10cr485 (E.D.V.A. June 21, 2011) (characterizing the charges against 
Mr. Risen as “harassment”); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the 
Government’s Motion In Limine and in Support of the Motion of James Risen to Quash 
Subpoena and/or For Protective Order, at 2; U.S. v. Sterling, No. 1:10cr485 (E.D.V.A. June 
21, 2011).
117. Affi davit of James Risen at 11, U.S. v. Sterling, No. 1:10cr485 (E.D.V.A. fi led 
June 21, 2011), ECF No. 115-2. 
118. Id. at 11. 
119. Id. at 11–12.
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secrecy, illegality, or malfeasance.”120 The District Court agreed with Risen in
part, and issued in order severely restricting Risen’s testimony to unprivileged 
information.121  
While the Obama administration would no doubt insist that it is not targeting 
the press in the recent spate of whistleblower prosecutions, the aggressive 
campaign to subpoena Risen suggests otherwise. Risen rightly recognized that 
the Obama administration’s whistleblower prosecutions “will have a chilling 
effect on the freedom of the press in the United States.”122
A SOLUTION: THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ENHANCEMENT ACT
What seems lost on most is that the best way to curtail leaks is to pass 
meaningful and effective whistleblower protection legislation and to stop, in 
the words of the Wall Street Journal, “criminalizing routine leaks.”123 Oddly, 
national security and intelligence offi cials are exempted from the current 
Whistleblower Protection Act, despite the fact that they often have the most 
signifi cant evidence of threats to our country.124 It is precisely these categories 
of employees who are most often in the best position to detect fraud, waste, 
and abuse, and also identify public health and safety problems.  
The current Whistleblower Protection Act is a sham:  
Enacted with the best of intentions, it has become a trap that rubber-
stamps almost any retaliation. The law was supposed to protect federal 
employees who expose fraud and misconduct from retaliation. But over 
the years, these protections have been completely undermined. One 
loophole gives the government the absolute right to strip employees of 
their security clearances and fi re them, without judicial review. Another 
bars employees of the National Security Agency and the Central 
Intelligence Agency from any coverage under the law. And Congress 
has barred national security whistle-blowers who are fi red for exposing 
wrongdoing from obtaining protection in federal court.125
120. Id. at 12–14. 
121. Order, at 1, U.S. v. Sterling, No. 1:10cr485 (E.D.V.A. Jul. 29, 2011). Undeterred, 
DOJ fi led a Motion for Reconsideration. Government’s Motion for Clarifi cation and 
Reconsideration, U.S. v. Sterling, No. 1:10cr485 (E.D.V.A. Aug. 24, 2011); Supplement 
to Government’s Motion for Clarifi cation and Reconsideration, U.S. v. Sterling, No. 
1:10cr485 (E.D.V.A. Sept. 2, 2011). The court denied the motion, but granted clarifi cation 
of Risen’s testimony, which would include a limited inquiry into a proposal for Risen’s 
book State of War. Order, U.S. v. Sterling, No. 1:10cr485 (E.D.V.A. Oct. 12, 2011).
122. Id. at 16.
123. L. Gordon Crovitz, Editorial, Information Age: WikiLeaks and the Espionage Act, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2011, at A13 (advocating that WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange can 
be prosecuted without criminalizing routine leaks).
124. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 
(1989) (codifi ed as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
125. See Stephen M. Kohn, Op-Ed., The Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES, June 
13, 2011, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/opinion/131cohn.html 
(criticizing weakness of current WPA).
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This lack of normal access to court has been the Achilles’ heel of the 
Act. Cases are enforced by a system of administrative hearings and limited 
judicial review, by unsympathetic administrative law judges: at the Merit 
Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit—which has monopoly 
jurisdiction over appeals.126 A stunning 204 out of 207 cases have gone against 
whistleblowers since Congress last unanimously “strengthened” the law’s free 
speech mandate.127 
The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA)128 does 
apply to IC whistleblowers, but it offers drastically less protection than even 
the WPA. The ICWPA fails to afford whistleblowers any meaningful protection 
from retaliation. Passed in 1998, the ICWPA was intended to “encourage” 
reporting of “wrongdoing within the Intelligence Community” to Congress 
because Congress, as a “co-equal branch of Government,” has a “‘need to 
know’ of allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch.”129 Congress 
recognized that even with regard to classifi ed information, whistleblowers 
were necessary for effective oversight of the intelligence community. The 
ICWPA sought to provide “a means for such employees and contractors to 
report to Congress while safeguarding the classifi ed information involved in 
such reporting.”130 Congress also recognized that fear of retaliation stifl ed IC 
employees: “[T]he risk of reprisal perceived by employees and contractors 
of the Intelligence Community for reporting serious or fl agrant problems to 
Congress may have impaired the fl ow of information needed by the intelligence 
committees to carry out oversight responsibilities.”131 
As an intellectual principle, the ICWPA was a signifi cant step forward. The 
law’s intent and fi ndings are accurate and appropriate. However, as a practical 
matter, little has changed within the intelligence agencies since the ICWPA’s 
passage, as evidenced by the Drake case.132 Drake followed the procedures 
outlined in the ICWPA perfectly in reporting his classifi ed concerns about 
gross waste, mismanagement, fraud, and illegality at NSA to the DOD IG and 
Congress.133 However, the procedure set up in the ICWPA failed to protect 
Drake from the severe reprisal of becoming the target of the New York Times 
leak investigation (for which he was not a source) or from being indicted under 
126. See, e.g., Tom Devine, The MSPB’s Terrible Ruling on Robert MacLean, THE 
WHISTLEBLOGGER (May 18, 2010), http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/31-2010/559-the-
mspbs-terrible-ruling-on-robert-maclean?format=pdf (describing and criticizing how the 
WPA is enforced by examining the case of Federal Air Marshall Robert MacLean).
127. Id. at 2.
128. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act, Pub. L. 105-272, Title 
VII, 112 Stat. 2413 (1998) (codifi ed as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. § 8H).
129. Id. at § 701(b).
130. Id. at § 701(b)(6) (emphasis added). 
131. Id. at § 701(b)(5).
132. See R. Jeffery Smith, Classifi ed Report Upheld Drake Complaint, WASH. 
POST, June 23, 2011, at A7, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
national-security/classified-pentagon-report-upholds-thomas-drakes-complaint-about-
NSA/2011/06/22/AGIVHTgH-story.html (chronicling the history of Drake case).
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the Espionage Act.134 From a public policy perspective, the ICWPA failed as 
well: even after the DOD IG vindicated Drake and substantiated his grave 
concerns, nothing changed at the NSA.135  
An oversight body like the DOD IG that is tasked with holding powerful 
IC agencies accountable must be able to receive disclosures and protect 
whistleblowers from reprisal. Even the Washington Post’s conservative editorial 
board recognizes the importance of strong and effective inspectors general: 
“Congress and the administration should work to strengthen the tools and 
independence of the IG[’]s, especially those in the intelligence communities. 
The administration should also quickly fi ll the [ten] IG vacancies, including 
those in the [DOJ], Homeland Security and State departments.”136 
Moreover, the Drake prosecution sends a chilling message to all IC employees 
that no matter how carefully they follow the ICWPA’s procedures, the criminal 
justice system can still be used against them. The Washington Post’s editorial 
board also acknowledged the chilling effect: “[t]he Drake case should serve 
as a reminder of the importance of giving government employees, especially 
those who work in areas that touch on national security, a clear and lawful path 
to allege malfeasance and abuse.”137 Without the freedom to warn for those 
on the front lines, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the public will keep 
getting blindsided. Without adequate internal disclosure channels, intelligence 
whistleblowers are faced with an impossible choice—either risk their careers 
(and, in Drake’s case, his liberty) by making unprotected disclosures, or remain 
silent about grave national security problems.  
The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) will prevent leaks 
and strengthen our national security.138 It creates a safer, responsible channel 
to work within the system, when none currently exist. Further, it does not, 
under any circumstances, protect public disclosures of classifi ed information, 
nor does it protect disclosures of sensitive sources and information to any 
unauthorized person or entity.
The WPEA, which has been around for almost a dozen years, nearly became 
law last year.139 It had been considered exhaustively, with three House and 
Senate hearings since 2006, and seven months of negotiations with the minority 
staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), satisfying all 
concerns raised by IC staff.140 One hundred senators passed the legislation by
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135. Id.
136. Editorial, Overreaching on Leaks, WASH. POST, June 13, 2011, at A16.
137. Id. 
138. See generally Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, S. 372, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
139. See generally Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, S. 372, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
140. See Joe Davidson, Has the Bell Tolled on Whistleblower Legislation?, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
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unanimous consent on December 10, 2010, but it was killed twelve days later 
by a “secret hold,” hours before Congress adjourned.141 
A “bipartisan group of senators, led by Daniel K. Akaka (D–Hawaii) and 
Susan Collins (R–Maine) . . . reintroduced the bill”142 in April, 2011. The 
legislation includes protection for national security whistleblowers that the 
House removed last December after objections by retiring member Pete 
Hoekstra (R–Mich.), the former ranking member of the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).143
The best way to prevent both “leaks” and “leak prosecutions” is to institute 
meaningful and effective internal whistleblowing channels, such as enacting 
the WPEA, and strengthening the Inspectors General, ensuring that they have 
the ability to protect their sources from all retaliation, including criminal 
prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Gabriel Schoenfeld’s true motives, like the motives of those in power who 
are following his lead, are best captured in his own words: “When you catch 
someone, you should make an example of them.”144 But making an example 
of public servants has everything to do with politics, and nothing to do with 
justice. Moreover, these prosecutions discourage others from making public 
their legitimate concerns regarding government programs.145 One hopes that 
that is an unintended consequence of the latest leak prosecutions; however, in 
reality, it seems to be precisely the point.
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